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Little Red Riding Hood or the Wolf:
How Far Can an Agent Reach into
Grandmother’s Pocketbook?
Erica E. Lord*
Tremendous focus has been placed on the immense intergenerational wealth transfer taking place in the United States.1 However, as
Americans continue to live longer, lifetime care for the elderly and disabled has become an equally important planning focus. Demographically, the median net worth of all American families is $97,300, and the
mean net worth $692,100.2 Many Americans have limited resources to
hire an attorney and lack estate plans altogether.3 Estate planning for
those individuals often means cheap and easy solutions, such as adding a
trusted family member or caregiver to a checking account and printing a
generic form of financial power of attorney (“POA”) from the internet
to enable the agent to withdraw cash and pay bills.
Beyond the population at large, high net worth individuals often
depend heavily on POAs for extensive financial management, including
transferring and investing in complex assets, managing eight- and ninefigure balance sheets, operating family offices, pledging and borrowing,
and even establishing new trusts and other estate planning vehicles.
Many affluent elderly individuals also seek to minimize the time they
spend on financial activities and prefer to allocate time to activities they
find more enjoyable than personal finances.
* Erica Lord is Assistant General Counsel at The Northern Trust Company. The
opinions and concepts presented in this article are solely the opinions of the author and
do not represent the opinions or positions of The Northern Trust Company.
1 See, e.g., Mark Hall, The Greatest Wealth Transfer In History: What’s Happening
And What Are The Implications, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2019, 12:14 PM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/markhall/2019/11/11/the-greatest-wealth-transfer-in-history-whats-happeningand-what-are-the-implications [https://perma.cc/T8R8-YRAK].
2 Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 12 (2017) (release of
2016-2019 data is expected late 2020).
3 See Hall, supra note 1 (providing statistics that implicate lack of resources
amongst many Americans); Astrid Andre, Can Estate Planning be Used to Help Preserve
Economic Assets in Low-Income Communities?, SHELTERFORCE (Mar. 1, 2019) https://
shelterforce.org/2019/03/01/can-estate-planning-preserve-economic-assets-in-low-incomecommunities/ [https://perma.cc/U8MW-6UKP] (“concern about up-front cost and a lack
of understanding of what would occur without a plan . . .”).
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POAs underpin many of these arrangements, and in the best circumstances, appropriately help address financial needs. However, opportunities abound for an agent to breach his fiduciary relationship to a
principal, and few guardrails exist to protect a disabled agent. As the
silent and baby boomer generations continue to live longer, inheritances
expected by their children may dwindle from the burden of rising health
and long-term care costs. The line can easily blur between the agent’s
duties to the principal and his need for additional assets. It can be
tempting for even a well-intentioned child, acting as agent, to splurge
and use mother’s savings to benefit the broader family, treating the entire family to a lavish cruise or contributing to an extravagant family
wedding. These expenses may not appear problematic on their face, but
are they within the scope of authority that mother intended to grant her
agent? Principles of agency law notwithstanding, in many situations
when an individual executes a POA, the agent is not likely to be present
and not likely to receive instruction regarding the agent’s duties and the
principal’s desires.4
Currently, no common mechanism exists to provide oversight for
agents acting under a POA other than oversight by the principal, who
may be elderly or disabled. While some niche elder care firms accept
agency appointments, their activities are unregulated and subject to uneven oversight. Most financial institutions are not equipped and so do not
serve as agent under a POA. More often, family members or trusted
caregivers serve as agents. Elderly individuals may feel uncomfortable
complaining about – let alone litigating – breaches against an agent,
both because of generational reluctance to bring suit against family
members, but also out of dependence and fear of losing the agent’s support in performing activities of daily life.5 Third parties have limited
ability to remove agents, as a court proceeding to appoint a guardian is
generally a prerequisite to bringing suit on behalf of a disabled principal. Without watchful friends, local family members, or sophisticated advisors, a rogue agent’s malfeasance can go undetected.
Without meaningful oversight, it is no surprise that POAs increasingly create opportunities for misuse of a principal’s funds, at best, and
outright financial exploitation, at worst.6 Often abuses are not apparent
until after death, and even then it may be difficult to investigate facts
4 Catherine Seal, Power of Attorney: Convenient Contract or Dangerous Document?, 11 MARQ, ELDER’S ADVISOR 307, 315 (2010).
5 Mary F. Radford, What If Granny Wants to Gamble? Balancing Autonomy and
Vulnerability in the Golden Years, 45 ACTEC L.J. 221, 242-44 (2020).
6 See, e.g., Hindman v. Moore, No. E2005-01287-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1408394,
at *1, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding third party claim to property pledged by principal’s son, acting as agent for his own benefit).
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and trace expenditures, particularly when the agent may be the individual also charged with administering the principal’s estate or a party may
lack standing to contest an agent’s actions.7 Although, post-death, relatives may come forward and question even the appearance of financial
exploitation, getting to the bottom of an agent’s activities can easily result in protracted litigation, which many heirs cannot afford to sustain.8
The question presented, then, is how can POAs be used to more effectively manage an elderly individual’s finances while guarding against potential overreach or outright breach by an agent?
I. HEIGHTENED LEGAL STANDARD
Although agents are fiduciaries under state law, “there is little clarity in state statutes about what that standard means.”9 Many states and
the Uniform Power of Attorney Act (“UPOAA”)10 impose a duty on
the agent to act in the best interests of the principal.11 This legal standard differs from that applicable to a trustee, who is required to act for
the sole interest of the beneficiary.12 As described in the comments to
the UPOAA, this lesser standard enables an agent to use the principal’s
funds to benefit the agent,13 which could tempt an agent to act for his
own interest.
Consider a single, disabled man, age 90, without descendants, who
designates his niece as agent. His deceased sister’s trust designates her
attorney as trustee and grants uncle a life estate in sister’s former home,
which passes to niece at uncle’s death. As agent, niece handles all of
uncle’s finances but also uses his personal assets to make substantial
improvements to the home, adding landscaping, a pool, and luxury
kitchen upgrades. The trustee has no objection, as the improvements
enhance the trust’s property at no cost to the trust, and the trustee has
no duty to monitor uncle’s funds, which will benefit charity upon his
death. Uncle benefits from the improvements to the extent they en7

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 107 cmt. b-c (AM. L. INST. 2012).
See, e.g., Danielle Moyaras & Andy Moyaras, Mysteries Surround the $400 Million Estate of Huguette Clark, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2011, 11:12 AM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/trialandheirs/2011/11/28/mysteries-surround-the-400-million-estate-ofhuguette-clark [https://perma.cc/RJL4-XXHN].
9 UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006).
10 At present, only 28 states have enacted the UPOAA in full (notably, California,
New York, Florida, and Illinois have not). Power of Attorney Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?communitykey=b19752548370-4a7c-947f-e5af0d6cb07c [https://perma.cc/B8Q5-DQP7].
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006); UNIF. POWER OF
ATT’Y ACT § 114(b), cmt.
12 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
13 UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114 cmt.
8
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hance the property’s aesthetic, but he does not realize value or benefit
from their utility.
Are these expenditures consistent with the principal’s reasonable
expectations?14 Will uncle feel comfortable correcting niece if he disagrees? At what point does niece transform from Red Riding Hood into
the Wolf, placing her own interests above uncle’s?
The UPOAA expressly provides niece is not liable simply because
she also benefits or has an individual or conflicting interest in relation to
the property.15 Imposing a heightened legal standard to require an agent
to act for the sole benefit of the principal could help curb abuse around
the margins when circumstances may tempt an agent to benefit herself.
The statutory form could prompt the principal to provide written guidance about his expectations and priorities for use of funds to provide
clearer direction to the agent.
II. IMPOSE ADDED STATUTORY PROTECTIONS

AND

OVERSIGHT

The UPOAA and some states build some guardrails around agent
authority, including requiring a specific grant of authority to permit an
agent to exercise so-called “hot” powers, which generally include powers allowing the agent to change distribution of the principal’s property
post-death and make gifts of the principal’s property.16 For example, the
UPOAA imposes specific limits on amounts and types of gifts that can
be made by an agent.17 Additionally, the UPOAA requires the agent to
“attempt to preserve the principal’s estate plan to the extent actually
known by the agent, if preserving this plan is consistent with the principal’s best interest” based on certain enumerated factors.18
Some states have not adopted a statutory POA form, and many
state statutes could be amended in small ways to adopt UPOAA limitations to create more meaningful limits on agent power. In addition, facilitating the appointment of co-agents could encourage greater oversight
where the principal can designate two trusted individuals. Where a single agent is the only option, state laws could enable the principal to
designate a third party or court to exercise annual oversight, receive accountings, or enforce the principal’s rights, akin to a monitor or a “designated representative” concept that has been adopted by the New York
POA statute and several state trust codes.19
14

Id. § 114(b)(5).
Id. § 114(d).
16 Id. § 114(h).
17 Id. § 217(b).
18 Id. § 114(b)(6).
19 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3339 (2020); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3/307(a)
(2020); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1513 (McKinney 2020).
15
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III. REVOCABLE LIVING TRUSTS
Where a principal has established and funded a revocable living
trust (“RLT”), that structure can help limit a rogue agent’s reach and
misuse of funds. Although an RLT alone does not prevent misuse of
assets, the trustee is subject to a higher fiduciary standard than an agent
and a trust document typically defines the trustee responsibilities and
settlor’s desires more fully than a POA. Moreover, professional trustees
and co-trustees can be appointed when an individual has few or no
trusted advisors. Generally speaking, trustees also are subject to more
oversight and can be required more easily to account to beneficiaries as
well as the settlor.
Notwithstanding the RLT structure, some agents attempt to reach
into the trust to access all of the principal’s assets, and state laws vary
regarding the extent to which an agent may reach beyond assets titled in
the principal’s individual name.20 The UPOAA clearly permits the agent
to act for the principal in the principal’s capacity as beneficiary of the
trust, receipting for property, participating in agreements, and even exercising powers of appointment held by the principal.21 However, some
non-statutory POAs are drafted to grant the agent access to trust assets
as if the agent were trustee of the principal’s RLT. Additionally, some
state statutes contain provisions occasionally interpreted as extending
an agent’s power over the principal’s RLT. For example, the Illinois
POA statute provides that an agent may not require the trustee of any
trust benefitting the principal to pay trust assets to the agent “unless
specific authority to that end is given, and specific reference to the trust
is made, in the statutory property power form.”22 Even absent this language, it seems clear an agent could exercise a mandatory right of withdrawal granted to the principal.23 Therefore, this power to demand trust
assets can create confusion between the trustee’s discretionary distribution powers and the agent’s powers over trust assets. It would be helpful
for states to very clearly tailor statutory language impacting the intersection between agent powers and trust assets, or alternatively, to eliminate
agent power to reach trust assets altogether.

20

See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3-4(n).
UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 211(b).
22 The Illinois statute creates further confusion by permitting an agent to “exercise
any power over any trust, estate, or property subject to fiduciary control.” 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/3-4(n).
23 See id.; see also UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 211(b) (discussing the general
authority granted to the power of attorney with respect to estates, trusts, and other beneficial interests).
21
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IV. CONCLUSION
Opportunities exist to improve many state POA statutes to better
safeguard elderly individuals from misdeeds by a rogue agent. Until better oversight can be incorporated into these statutes, principals should
communicate their intentions to agents when executing a POA and
before disability prevents those conversations. Attorneys and advisors
play a key role in helping principals and agents understand the obligations and potential pitfalls of POAs.

